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Torts
Torts; wrongful death plaintiffs
Code of Civil Procedure §377 (amended).
SB 404 (Wilson); STATS 1977, Ch 792

Support: State Bar of California
Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure generally provides that when a
person's death is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, an action
for damages may be brought only by the heirs of the decedent. Chapter 792
amends this wrongful death statute to include within the definition of
"heirs," as used within the statute, minors who resided in the decedent's
household at the time of, and 180 days previous to, his or her death and who
were dependent upon the decedent for at least half of their support [CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE §377]. In this manner, Chapter 792 authorizes such
minors to bring an action for the decedent's wrongful death [CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE §377(b) (3)]. Prior to the enactment of Chapter 792, only two
classes of persons were allowed to bring such actions: (1) persons who
would have inherited the decedent's estate had he or she died intestate
[E.g., Redfield v. Oakland Consol. St. Ry. Co., 110 Cal. 277, 289-90, 42
P. 822, 825 (1895); Kunakoff v. Woods, 166 Cal. App. 2d 59, 62, 332 P.2d
773, 775 (1958); see CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 1241, §5.5, at 3190]; and (2) if

dependent upon the decedent, the putative spouse, children of the putative
spouse, stepchildren, and parents of the decedent [CAL. STATS. 1975, c.
1241, §5.5, at 3190]. Extension of the cause of action for wrongful death to
certain minors does not alter the definition of "heirs" for purposes other
than the wrongful death statute [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §377(b) (3)]. Thus,
to bring a wrongful death action now, minors-persons under 18 years of
age [CAL. Civ. CODE §251-need not be related to the decedent but need
only to have resided with that person for 180 days prior to his or her death

and to have been dependent upon the decedent for one half or more of their
support, which is the same amount of support prescribed for dependency for
taxation purposes [I.R.C. §152(A); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §17056; CAL.
CIv. PROc. CODE §377(b) (3)].
COMMENT

Wrongful death statutes have traditionally been intended to benefit only
the decedent's relatives and not unrelated persons who may suffer pecuniary
loss from the death [2 S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH §
10:21 (2d ed. 1975)]. Furthermore, wrongful death actions were generally
not allowed at common law but were based exclusively on statute [See I S.
SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH §1.1

(2d ed. 1975). But see
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Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 409 (1970); Gaudette v.
Webb, 362 Mass: 60, 69, 284 N.E.2d 222, 229 (1972)], a view recently
reaffirmed in California [See Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 573, 565
P.2d 122, 128, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 103 (1977)]. Accordingly, Section 377 of
the code of Civil Procedure has consistently been construed to limit the right
to bring a wrongful death action to those persons described in this statute
[E.g., Steed v. Imperial Airlines, 12 Cal. 3d 115, 119, 524 P.2d 801, 803,
115 Cal. Rptr. 329, 331 (1974); Fuentes v. Tucker, 31 Cal. 2d 1,9-10, 187
P.2d 752, 757 (1947)]. There was one brief exception, however, when the
California Supreme Court originally decided Steed v. Imperial Airlines
[515 P.2d 17, 110 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1973), vacated, 12 Cal. 3d 115, 524 P.2d
801, 115 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1974)] by a four to three decision, holding that the
denial of a stepchild's right to bring a wrongful death action for the death of
her stepfather, when a natural child could bring such an action, constituted a
denial of equal protection of the law under the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution [Id. at 22, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 222]. Within seven
weeks, after the appointment of a new justice to the court, a rehearing was
granted. In July of 1974, the court vacated its earlier holding in another four
to three decision with the new justice siding with the former minority [Steed
v. Imperial Airlines, 12 Cal. 3d 115, 524 P.2d 801, 115 Cal. Rptr. 329
(1974)]. The three justices who became the new minority filed a strong
dissent espousing the court's responsibility to interpret legislation so as to
save its constitutionality [Id. at 127, 524 P.2d at 808, 115 Cal. Rptr. at
3361. These dissenting justices adamantly maintained that exclusion of
stepchildren from the right to sue for wrongful death was violative of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, relying heavily on
recent United States Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court
decisions that had found such violations in laws not allowing wrongful death
actions by illegitimate children [Id. at 126-32, 524 P.2d at 808-12, 115 Cal.
Rptr. at 336-40. See generally Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406
U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Arizmendi v.
System Leasing Corp., 15 Cal. App. 3d 730, 93 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1971)].
This final holding in Steed v. ImperialAirlines [12 Cal. 3d 115, 524 P.2d
801, 115 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1974)], as applicable to stepchildren, was eventually altered by a 1975 amendment to Section 377 [CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 334,
§2, at 784]. Prior to that amendment, classification of those entitled to bring a
wrongful death action in California had always been based entirely upon
blood lines, except when substituted by adoption [12 Cal. 3d at 123, 524
P.2d at 806, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 334 (construing CAL. STATS. 1968, c. 766, at
1488)]. An express intent of this 1975 amendment was to alter the rule of
law set forth in Steed, which prevented unadopted dependent stepchildren
from bringing such actions [CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 334, §2, at 784]. Thus,
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with the exception of California, a wrongful death action by a stepchild is
generally not allowed in the United States [See 2 S. SPEIShR, RECOVERY FOR
WRONGFUL DEATH § 10:8 (2d ed. 1975)]. Nevertheless, at least one state has
allowed recovery when the decedent stepparent stood in loco parentis to the
child [ARK. STATS. ANN. §27-908 (1962); see Moon Distributors, Inc. v.
White, 245 Ark. 627, 633, 434 S.W.2d 56, 59 (1968)].
By enacting Chapter 792, the legislature again appears to have broken
new ground by allowing a minor to bring an action for wrongful death as
long as he or she was dependent upon and residing with the decedent at the
time of his death-even though the decedent was neither standing in loco
parentis nor related to the minor [See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §377]. Prior
to the enactment of Chapter 792, when two children were raised by a
decedent and were entirely dependent upon him or her, one being the child
of a putative spouse or the decedent's natural, adopted or stepchild, and the
other not having such a relationship, only the former could recover, even
though both suffered substantially the same injury as a result of the death of
the decedent [See CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 334, §1, at 783-84]. Therefore, the
intent of the legislature in enacting Chapter 792 is apparently to protect
economically and possibly emotionally dependent minors, who do not
otherwise qualify as heirs, from any injustice caused by their inability to
bring an action for the wrongful death of decedents from whom they had
previously received support [See STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, 1975 CONFERENCE RESOLUTION

3-3;

STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, COMM. ON THE ADMIN-

ISTPATION OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT, Item 7 (1976)].
Since the final holding in Steed, three of the four justices who made up
the final majority (Wright, C.J., Sullivan and McComb, JJ.) have retired
from the court, while two of the dissenters (Mosk and Tobriner, JJ.) remain.
With the new makeup of the court, the two dissenters from the final holding
in Steed may find supporters in the court's new members. If this were to
occur, it is conceivable that a person not within the protected class of
Section 377, but in a class similar to that so protected, might prevail by
claiming that he or she was denied equal protection under the law [See Steed
v. Imperial Airlines, 515 P.2d 17, 22, 110 Cal. Rptr. 217, 222 (1973),
rev'd on rehearing, 12 Cal. 3d 115, 123, 524 P.2d 801, 806, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 329, 334 (1974)]. For instance, dependent adults not related to but
living with the decedent at his or her death could argue that extension by
Chapter 792 of protection to minors in a similar situation unfairly excludes
adults from protection in that they would suffer essentially the same injury
as would a dependent minor. The California Supreme Court, however, has
often reiterated the right of the legislature to confer rights of action to
particular classes for injuries not previously actionable without giving the
same right to all persons that suffer from such injuries. [E.g., Justus v.
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Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 580-81, 565 P.2d 122, 133, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97,
108 (1977); Pritchard v. Whitney Estate Co., 164 Cal. 564, 568, 129 P.
989, 992 (1913)]. This legislative right can be denied only if it appears
beyond a rational doubt that an arbitrary discrimination between similarly
situated classes has been made without reasonable cause [E.g., Justus v.
Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 580-81, 565 P.2d 122, 133, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97,
108 (1977); Pritchard v. Whitney Estate Co., 164 Cal. 564, 568, 129 P.
989, 992 (1913)]. Since the law is replete with special provisions concerning minors [See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§33, 35 (contractual limitations),
§§196, 196a (right to support from parents)], it appears the court could
easily find that drawing a distinction between adults and minors in the
wrongful death statute is not arbitrary discrimination. Such an argument also
appears to invoke a dependency test, which the minority in the final holding
of Steed specifically rejected [12 Cal. 3d at 132 n.4, 524 P.2d at 812 n.4,
115 Cal. Rptr. at 340 n.4]. Perhaps a more viable argument could be
presented by a stepparent who-along with a natural parent-was dependent
upon the deceased adult offspring for support. The legislature has included
parents among those defined as "heirs" who are able to bring wrongful
death actions under Section 377 [CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §377(b)(2)]. The
natural parent could therefore recover; but stepparents, who have generally
been found not to qualify as "parents" under such wrongful death statutes
[See, e.g., California State Auto Ass'n Inter-Insurance Bureau v. Jacobson,
24 Cal. App. 3d 850, 853, 101 Cal. Rptr. 366, 368 (1972); 2 S. SPEISER,
RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 10:13 (2d ed. 1975)], apparently could
not recover. A new majority on the California court, using the same equal
protection rationale espoused in the Steed dissent, could hold that to preserve the constitutionality of the statute it must be interpreted so that
stepparents dependent upon the decedent would be included in the statute's
definition of "heirs" [See 12 Cal. 3d at 127-32, 524 P.2d at 808-12, 115
Cal. Rptr. at 336-40].
In summary, extension by Chapter 792 of a right of action for wrongful
death to minors living with and dependent upon the decedent, even if there
was no blood relationship between them, is a unique extension of the
statutory right beyond that which has been previously allowed in California
or other jurisdictions. It could also conceivably open the way for the courts
to grant even wider extension of this right to others similarly situated based
on the theory that it would be a denial of equal protection of law not to do
SO.
See Generally:

1) 4 B.

WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §788 (defining heirs) (8th ed. 1974);
§§788, 789A (heirs under 1975 amendment) (Supp. 1976).
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7 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELEC-ED 1975 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 562 (wrongful death)
(1976).

Torts; statute of limitations for legal malpractice
Code of Civil Procedure §340.6 (new).
AB 298 (Brown); STATS 1977, Ch 863
Support: Association of California Defense Counsels
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 863, there apparently was no law
expressly providing a statute of limitation for legal malpractice actions or
professional negligence suits against an attorney [See CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §§337, 339, 340]. Generally, such actions were brought under the two
year period of limitation prescribed by Section 339(1) of the Code of Civil
Procedure [See Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal.
3d 176, 182, 491 P.2d 421, 424, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 840 (1971)]. In an
effort to codify an express period of limitation, which supporters argue
would help curb the increase in lawyer malpractice insurance rates [Sacramento Bee, Aug. 24, 1977, §A, at 7, col. 1]. Chapter 863 creates a
separate statute of limitation for professional negligence suits against an
attorney similar to that for medical malpractice actions [Compare CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE §340.6(a)-(c) with CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §340.5]. Thus,

Chapter 863 provides that an action against an attorney for a wrongful act or
omission, other than for actual fraud, arising in the performance of professional services, must be commenced within one year after the plaintiff
discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the facts constituting the wrongful act or omission, or four years
from the date of the wrongful act or omission, whichever occurs first [CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE §340.6(a)]. Although not defined by Chapter 863, the

term "wrongful act" has generally been construed in negligence actions to
mean simply a tortious act, or an act accomplished without due care under
the circumstances [See Callum v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 186 Cal.
App. 2d Supp. 885, 888, 337 P.2d 259, 260 (1959) (negligent discharge of
a gun causing injury to plaintiff was a "wrongful act" and covered by the
bond written by defendant)]. Thus, "a wrongful act or omission . . .
arising in the performance of professional services" would appear to refer to
professional negligence [Compare CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §340.6(a) with
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §340.5(2)].

Chapter 863 provides, however, that the period of limitation will be tolled
whenever any of the following conditions exists: (1) the plaintiff has not
sustained actual injury; (2) the attorney continues to represent the plaintiff
regarding the specific subject matter in which the alleged wrongful act or
omission occurred; (3) for the purpose of tolling the four year period only,
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 9
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the attorney willfully conceals the facts constituting the wrongful act or
omission when such facts are known to him or her; or (4) the plaintiff is
under a legal or physical disability that restricts his or her ability to commence a legal action [See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §340.6(a)]. For the
purpose of these conditions, it appears to be unclear at what point a plaintiff
will have suffered actual injury so as to commence the running of the statute
of limitation on a legal malpractice cause of action. It has been suggested
that the payment of attorney's fees and costs for services that were negligent
and therefore exceeded the value of the legal services rendered may be
sufficient [Solis, Statute of Limitations in Legal Malpractice Cases: The
California Supreme Court Establishes New Guidelines, 7 U.S.F. L. REV.
85, 89, 91, 103 (1972-73); see Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 201-02, 491
P.2d 433, 437, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849, 853 (1971)]. In any case, whether actual
damages have occurred would appear to be a question of fact for the court or
the trier of fact [Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 202,491 P.2d 433, 437-38,
98 Cal. Rptr. 849, 853-54 (1971)].
For the tolling of the four-year limitation period, Chapter 863 also fails to
define the term "willfully conceals" as it is to apply under the new law.
Insofar as the courts accept the definition of "willfully" provided by the
Penal Code, the term "willfully conceals" would appear to require a
showing of no more than a purpose or willingness to conceal the facts
relating to the professional negligence claim, and not require proof of any
intent to violate the law [Compare CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE §340.6 with CAL.
PENAL CODE §7]. Furthermore, the phrase "legal or physical disability,"
which restricts the plaintiff's ability to commence a legal action, as used in
Chapter 863 would appear to refer to minors, or insane or imprisoned
persons [Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §340.6(a) with CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §352].
Finally, in an action against an attorney based on an instrument in
writing, the effective date of which depends upon some act or event in the
future, the period of limitation will commence to run upon the occurrence of
that future event [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §340.6(b)]. Thus, Chapter 863
establishes a one year period of limitation, from the date of discovery, for
the initiation of a lawsuit against an attorney for professional negligence, or
in the alternative, a period of four years from the date of the negligent act,
with the exception that the period will be tolled under certain conditions
[See CAL. CIV. PROc. CODE §340.6(a)].
See Generally:
I) 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Actions §§331A, 331B (attorney malpracticedelayed accrual) (Supp. 1977).
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Torts; good samaritan immunity
Civil Code §1714.2 (new).
SB 601 (Beverly); STATS 1977, Ch 595
Support: American Heart Association (Los Angeles Chapter); American
National Red Cross; California Department of Health; California Highway Patrol; CPR Council of Los Angeles; California Medical Association
Chapter 595 has added Section 1714.2 to the Civil Code to protect
persons trained in cardiopulmonary resuscitation techniques, as well as
individuals and groups that supply such training, from civil liability for acts
or omissions resulting from rendering cardiopulmonary resuscitation in
good faith and for no compensation in emergency situations. Under a variety
of previously enacted good samaritan statutes, individuals immune from
civil liability when rendering emergency care at the scene of an emergency
include, inter alia, licensed doctors [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §2144],
licensed dentists [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §1627.5], registered nurses
[CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §2727.5], vocational nurses [CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE §2861.5], trained members of emergency vehicle rescue teams [CAL.
VEH. CODE §165.5], persons trained in first aid who are summoned by
authorities to aid in search or rescue operations [CAL. GOV'T CODE §50086],
and paramedics following instructions of a physician or nurse [CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE §1483]. Chapter 595 now includes in this group, those
qualified persons who render or provide training in cardiopulmonary resuscitation [CAL. CIV. CODE §1714.2].
Cardiopulmonary resuscitation is an emergency procedure combining
both artificial respiration and artifical circulation (by manual chest compression) to treat persons stricken with cardiac arrest [AMERICAN NATIONAL RED
CROSS, CARDIOPULMONARY RESUSCITATION passim (1974)], which may
follow trauma such as myocardial occlusion, chest injuries, near drownings,
electrocutions, anaphylactic or hemorrhagic shock, or certain poisonings
[IMMEDIATE CARE OF THE ACUTELY ILL AND INJURED 45 (cardiopulmonary

resuscitation) (H. Stevenson, Jr. ed. 1974)]. Most of the 800,000 victims of
fatal heart attacks each year and most of those dying from severe injuries die
before reaching the hospital [Id. at 58]. There is evidence that a substantial
percentage of these patients could be saved if adequate resuscitative efforts
were immediately available [Id.]. The success of the heart-lung resuscitation is directly related to the speed and efficiency with which it is applied;
lack of oxygen to body tissues during heart stoppage for periods of more
than four to six minutes will result in brain damage or death [MERCK, SHARP
& DOHME RESEARCH LABORATORIES, THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS
AND THERAPY 1663 (12th ed. 1972)].
To be protected by Section 1714.2, persons rendering such emergency
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 9

Torts
treatment must have completed a basic cardiopulmonary resuscitation
course that complies with standards adopted by the American Heart Association or the American Red Cross [CAL. CIV. CODE §1714.2(a)]. Furthermore, Section 1714.2 requires that aid must be rendered at the scene of the
emergency, in good faith [CAL. CIV. CODE §1714.2(a)] and without expectation of compensation from the individual receiving the emergency care
[CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.2(e)]. Immunity is not granted when the conduct of
the person rendering the cardiopulmonary resuscitation amounts to gross
negligence [CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.2(b)]. No public or private organization
or entity, however, that supports, sponsors, or finances cardiopulmonary
resuscitation programs shall be liable for any civil damages resulting from
such training programs [CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.2(c)]; nor shall any certified
instructor of cardiopulmonary resuscitation be liable for civil damages for
any acts or omissions of persons who received training from that instructor
[CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.2(d)]. It appears that the purpose of Section 1714.2
is to encourage groups and agencies to train individuals in cardiopulmonary
techniques and to encourage citizens to participate in such training by
extending the protection of good samaritan statutes to such parties [See
CAL. CIV. CODE §1714.2(a), (c), (d)].
See Generally:
I) 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §163 (emergency medical aid) (8th ed.
1974), (Supp. 1976).
2) Note, California Good Samaritan Legislation: Exemptions from Civil Liability While
Rendering Emergency Medical Aid, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 816 (1963).

Torts; informed consent in an emergency
Business and Professions Code §2144.5 (new).
AB 896 (Berman); STATS 1977, Ch 668
Support: California Medical Association; United Physicians of California
Opposition: California Trial Lawyers Association
Chapter 668 adds Section 2144.5 to the Business and Professions Code
and appears to codify the common law exemption from civil liability for
physicians who render emergency medical aid without first having informed
the patient of the possible risks [Compare CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§2144.5 with Preston v. Hubbell, 87 Cal. App. 2d 53, 57-58, 196 P.2d 113,
115 (1948)]. The new statutory exemption is applicable only to actions for
injuries or death arising out of a physician's or podiatrist's failure to inform
the patient and not for actions arising out of negligence in rendering or
failure to render treatment [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §2144.5(b)].
Generally, a physician has a duty to his or her patient to make a reasonable disclosure of available choices with respect to proposed therapy and
Selected 1977 California Legislation

Torts

the dangers inherently and potentially involved in each [Cobbs v. Grant, 8
Cal. 3d 229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514 (1972)]. The
scope of the physician's duty to inform is measured by the patient's need for
material information upon which to base an intelligent choice [Id. at 245,
502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515]. Whether a particular potential peril
must be divulged depends upon whether it would be material to the patient's
decision [Id.]. If a patient suffers an injury from a risk known to the
physician and if the patient can establish that he or she would not have
consented to the treatment had he or she known of the risk, then the
physician may be liable for negligent malpractice [See id.; W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 106 (4th ed. 1971)]. Usually an action for
battery will arise if the physician does not obtain consent before performing
treatment or if the physician performs a type of treatment substantially
different from that consented to by the patient [See Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal.
3d 229, 239, 502 P.2d 1, 7, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 511 (1972)]. It has been the
common law rule, however, that the physician is justified in rendering such
treatment without the express consent of the patient in cases of emergency
when immediate action is necessary for the preservation of life or health and
it is impractical to first obtain consent for treatment that the physician deems
immediately necessary [See Preston v. Hubbell, 87 Cal. App. 2d 53, 5758, 196 P.2d 113, 115-16 (1948)]. In such an emergency situation, consent
is implied [Id.; see Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104
Cal. Rptr. 505, 514 (1972)].
Chapter 668 codifies this common law immunity in certain circumstances
by providing that a physician or a podiatrist shall not be liable for damages
for injury or death caused in an emergency situation occurring in a physician's or a podiatrist's office or a hospital for failure to inform the patient of
possible consequences of a medical procedure if the failure to inform was
caused by the following: (1) the unconscious state of the patient [CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE §2144.5(a)(1)]; or (2) the physician's or podiatrist's reasonable belief that, because of medical necessity, there was insufficient time
to inform fully either the patient [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §2144.5(a)(2)]
or the person authorized to give informed consent for a patient legally
incapable of so consenting [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §2144.5(a)(3)].
An "emergency situation" as used in Section 2144.5 refers to a situation
requiring immediate services for alleviation of severe pain or immediate
diagnosis and treatment of unforseeable medical conditions which, if not
immediately diagnosed and treated, would lead to serious disability or death
[CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §2144.5(c)(3)]. "Physician" is defined as a
person licensed as a physician and surgeon pursuant to either Chapter 5
(commencing with Section 2000) of the Business and Professions Code or
the Osteopathic Initiative Act [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§2144.5(c)(1),
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 9
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3600 to 3600-5]; and "podiatrist" refers to a person licensed as a podiatrist
pursuant to Business and Professions Code Sections 2525 through 2525.24
[CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §2144.5(c)(2)]. "Hospital" as used in this
section means a licensed general acute care hospital as defined in Section
1250 of the Health and Safety Code (a hospital providing 24-hour inpatient
care with an organized medical staff providing certain specified basic
services) [Compare CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §2144.5(c)(4) with CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §1250(a)], while "office" refers to a place, other
than a hospital, used by the physician or podiatrist for examination or
treatment of patients [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §2144.5(c)(5)]. Thus,
Chapter 668 creates a statutory exception to the requirement that a physician
or podiatrist informs a patient of material risks involved in proposed
emergency medical treatment when to furnish information is impossible or
impractical, thereby codifying an established exception to common law tort
liability.
See Generally:
1) CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §2144.
2) Simonaitis, The Law of Informed Consentin All Jurisdictions,14 CAL. TRIAL LAW. A.J. 87
(Winter 1974-75).
3) Comment, Patients' Rights and Informed Consent:An Emergency Casefor Hospitals?, 12
CAL. W.L. REV. 406 (1976).

Torts; releases from liability
Business and Professions Code §§6152, 6153 (amended).
AB 1882 (Berman); STATS 1977, Ch 799
(Effective September 14, 1977)
Support: California Railroad Association
Prior to enactment of Chapter 799, a general release from a liability claim
was presumed fraudulent if obtained from an individual within 15 days of
his or her admission to a medical facility for treatment of the injury alleged
to have given rise to the claim, or prior to his or her release from such a
facility, whichever occurred first [CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1016, §1, at-].
Section 6152(b) of the Business and Professions Code has been amended to
make the presumption of fraud apply to general releases obtained during the
period of intial confinement as an inpatient or outpatient in a clinic or health
facility if executed within 15 days from commencement of that confinement. "Health facility" as used in Section 6152(b), is defined as any
facility or place organized, maintained and operated for the diagnosis, care,
prevention and treatment of physical or mental illness to which persons are
admitted for a 24-hour stay or longer

[CAL. HEALTH

&

SAFETY CODE

§ 1250]. By contrast, "clinics," which are generally operated for the same
basic purposes, include facilities that offer more limited services than a
Selected 1977 California Legislation
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health facility and that admit persons for periods of less than 24 hours [See
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE

§§1202, 1203].

Section 6152 apparently is intended, among other things, to protect
injured parties from being harrassed or exploited by claims agents [8 PAC.

L.J.,

REVIEW OF SELECTED

1976

CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION

279, 280

(1977)]. Chapter 799 arguably furthers this intent and resolves the ambiguities ill the previously existing statute by substituting "health facility"
and "clinic," with specified definitions, for the term "medical facility"
and by specifying that a person protected by the statute may be either an
inpatient or outpatient [See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §6152(b)]. Consistent
with this effect Chapter 799 also amends Section 6153, which formerly
provided that any violation of Section 6152 was a misdeameanor [CAL.
STATS. 1976, c. 1125, §3.5, at-], to specify that only violations of Section
6152(a), which are concerned with the use of cappers and runners for
attorneys, create criminal liability. Thus, Chapter 799 would appear to
clarify the law governing the validity of general releases obtained from
individuals still being treated for compensable injuries.
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